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NOTE AND COMMENT
THE "RIGHT" TO BREAK A CONTRACT.It is common knowledge that the
fully developed common law affords no means to compel the performance
of a contract according to its terms. Does it follow from this that there
is no legal obligation to perform a contract, or if obligation there be, that it
is alternative: to perform or pay damages? A note in the XIV MIcr. L.
Rv. 48o appears to give an affirmative answer to this question and at least
one court (Frye v. Hubbell, 74 N. H. 358, at p. 374) has taken the same
view. Probably the most forcible exposition of this position is given by
Justice Holmes in his admirable address, "TH4 PATH O* THE LAW" (O
HARV. L. Rzv. at p. 462). The passage is sufficiently picturesque to deserve
quotation: "Nowhere is the confusion between legal and moral ideas more
manifest than in the law of contract. Among other things, here again the
so called primary rights and duties are invested with a mystic significance
beyond what can be assigned and explained. The duty to keep a contract at
common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not
keep it,-and nothing else. If you commit a tort, you are liable to pay a
compensatory sum. If you commit a contract, you are liable to pay a com-
pensatory sum unless the promised event comes to pass, and that is all the
difference. But such a mode of looking at the matter stinks in the nostrils
of those who think it advantageous to get as much ethics into the law as
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they can. It was good enough for Lord Coke, however, and here, as in
many other cases, I am content to abide with him."
Why was it good enough for Lord Coke? Perhaps the history of the
common law affords some explanation. Pollock and Maitland have shown
(HisT. op ENG. LAW (ed. 2) II, 595 if.) that specific relief is certainly as
old, probably older than the action for damages. In the time of Glanville
'damages' are a novelty. A plaintiff goes to the king's court and asks for a
specific thing, of which the defendant unjustly 'deforces' him. He does not
want money, compensation; he wants and gets the specific thing. Of the
oldest group of actions there is not one which is an action for damages. It
is true that most of the judgments in favor of plaintiffs are judgments
awarding seisin of land (PoLLocK AND MArrAND, op. cit., II, 523), but the
law, not content to stop at this, aimed at specific relief even in case of the
breach of a contractual obligation. Putting aside the action of Debt, where
the specific character of the relief may be a coincidence, some insight into the
attitude of the early common law may be gained from the action of Covenant.
This action was probably invented for the protection of the termor, who had
no real right in the land, only the benefit of a covenant. But the relief which
he obtained was not damages, as a case in i226 (BRAcTow's NoT Booxc, pl.
1739) shows beyond question. A lessor broke his agreement (conuencio)
that his lessee should hold the land for ten years. The court decided that the
agreement must be kept and that the plaintiff should recover seisin, or, as we
should say, possession, of the land. (Et ideo consideraturn est quod conuen-
cio teneatur et quod Hugo habeat seisinam suam usque ad terminum suum
* * * ) If this is not a judgment for the 'specific performance' of the cove-
nant, it is difficult to say what it is. But of course a judge of the thirteenth
century, as an ecclesiastic, would probably have no scruples about importing
ethics into the lawl Such a judgment, however, is no isolated phenomenon.
Cf. HAZELTINE, EAiRLY HISTORY or ENGLISH EQUITY,-ESSAYS IN LEGAZ HIS-
TORy (ed. Vinogradoff) 269, ff.; POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, Op. Cit. II 595. It
was thoroughly in keeping with the spirit of the common law at its great
formative period. Bracton probably gave expression to a truism when he
wrote (fol. 413 b): "* * * Tot erunt formulae brevium quot sunt genera
actionum** *:" There may be as many forms of action as there are causes
of action; that is to say, the remedy necessarily follows the right and the first
inquiry should always be: What is the right? If there be a right, it should
have an appropriate remedy. And the judges seemed convinced that the obli-
gation of the covenantor was to perform his covenant. An action was in-
vented to compel him so to do.
Had the common law continued its organic development, it is possible
that specific relief might have been the rule rather than the exception; but
the gradually encroaching power of parliament stifled its growth. The STAT-
uTJ or WALES struck a heavy blow at Covenant, and the conservatism of the
judges robbed that action of its possible contributions to the law of contract.
The chancery did vary some formulas to suit new cases, but this power was
used rarely and with great caution. The inevitable result was that the
mediaval common law became a law about remedies. See Maitland in 3
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HAav. L. RXv. 97. In the YzaR BooKs there is little or no talk of substantive
law; it is procedure with which the judges are occupied. No longer is any
such work as that of Bracton possible; for the lawyer is interested in the
nature of writs, not of rights. Thus Bracton's striking statement remains
true only if inverted. From the forms of action the causes of action must
be deduced. There is -a right only where there is a remedy. And the remedy
for breach of contract is found in what was originally a tort action; naturally
it sounds only in damages. It is not difficult, therefore, to see why the medie-
val lawyer, constrained to think in the terms of remedies, should regard the
right of the promisee as confined to damages only. There could be no obli-
gation to perform a contract if the chancery afforded no writ to enforce such
an obligation.
It may be that some such thought was present in the mind of Lord Coke.
In Bromage v. Genning (I Roll. R. 368; Amns, CASUS IN EQUITY JURISDIC-
TioN, 38, n.) a plaintiff sought a prohibition from the King's Bench against
a suit for specific performance of a lease, on the ground that the proper rem-
edy was an action at law. Coke was clearly of opinion that a court of equity
should not decree specific performance for that "this would subvert the in-
tent of the covenantor, since he intended to have his election to pay dam-
ages or to make the lease, and they would compel him to make the lease
against his will * * *." It is no coincidence that the year of this decision, 1616,
was the very year of the bitter controversy between Lord Coke and Lord
Ellesmere, the results of which are familiar to every one. The supremacy
of the court of Chancery was established, and, as Ames has well said, Lord
Coke's defeat in his contest with Lord Ellesmere was matched by his failure
to check the jurisdiction of the chancellor in matters of contract. Ames,
loc. cit. Coke took a purely formal view of the obligation of the promisor.
Though he may have justified it to himself by reasoning from remedy to
right, he was no doubt eager to find any basis upon which to challenge the
jurisdiction of Chancery. One can scarcely regard his attitude as other than
that of a special pleader.
Equity has taken a substantial view. In decreeing specific performance
it enforces the contractual obligation of the promisor according t6 the terms
of his promise, so far as that is possible. But the obligation is a legal obliga-
tion and equity is acting in aid of a legal right. That the obligation is essen-
tially legal, though not enforced specifically by a court of law, may be seen
if the matter be looked at from another angle. Where there has been a
repudiation of a contract or a material breach, the aggrieved party is not al-
ways driven to an action for damages, even when he may not resort to equity.
If he has himself performed in whole or in part, he may elect to disregard
the contract and demand restitution in value for what he has done. He has
thus a "right to restitution as an alternative remedy instead of compensation
in damages". WLISTON'S WA.S'S POLLOCK ON CONTRACTS, p. 334 ff. The
primary right remains, however, the right to performance; the only primary
obligation is the obligation to perform the contract. WooDwARD, QuAsi CON-
TRACTS, § 26D. What becomes, then, of the right to break a contract? What
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has befallen the promisor's prediction that he will only pay damages if he
does not perform? Specific performance in equity and restitution at law
.give a pertinent answer to these questions.
Undoubtedly the promisor who cannot be compelled to perform his prom-
ise does have some definite legal capacity. It seems more accurate to de-
scribe this as a power,-a power to break the contract. As Professor Hoh-
feld has pointed out in a spirited article (FuNDAm4NTA. LtGAL CONCXPTIONS,
23 YAIr L. Jotmx. i6, ff.), right and duty are correlative terms. There can
be no right without a duty. But the correlative of power is liability. Thus
the promisor may have the ability or power to alter the legal relations grow-
ing out of the contract, to create in himself a liability. The duty of the
promisor is, with due respect to Justice Holmes, to perform his promise,
-ut by the exercise of a power he may in certain cases convert this duty
into a liability. The exercise of a power in such case is wrongful but effect-
ual; for it is of the essence of a power that it may alter, divest, or create
rights.
It is submitted, therefore, that neither the history of the common law
nor logic sustains the proposition that there is no legal obligation to perform
a contract or, conversely, that there is a right to break a contract. To sup-
port such a notion is to hark back to the later YzAR BOOKS which ascribe
-property (propretie) to the trespasser, even to the thief, because, forsooth,
the owner has no action against the third hand. Cf. PoTr.ocK AND MAITLAND,
OP. cit, II, I56, ff. The unhappy results of this vicious process of reasoning
are sufficiently striking to warn us of the danger involved in a similar mis-
take today. W. T. B.
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